Archive Note:The text is from the old Legal Selectmen's archive and has been carefully preserved for historical and informative reading.

The repetition of the criminal procedure

provided for by article 525 of the C.P.D. consideredextraordinary criminal procedurefor the purpose of correcting the errors of the irrevocable conviction, concerning the convicted person or the court. With the extraordinary procedure (Article 525 of the Criminal Code), the criminal procedure, which ended with the issuance of an irrevocable decision, is repeated in the interest ofthe convictedfor a misdemeanor or a felony, in the following cases: • (1) if two people were convicted of the same act by two different decisions and it becomes indisputably clear from their comparison that one of the two is innocent, • (2) if, after someone's conviction,new-unknown to the judges who sentenced him-facts or evidencewere revealed, which alone or in combination with those previously presented make it clear that the person convicted is innocent or wrongfully convicted of a crime worse than the one he actually committed, • (3) if it is ascertained that false statements of witnesses or expert opinions or false evidence or persuasions, which were brought or taken into account at the hearing, or bribery or other intentional breach of duty by the judge or juror who participated in the trial, which decided the conviction. Criminal acts must be proven by an irrevocable court decision, unless such a decision was not issued because there were legal reasons that prevented the adjudication of the case on its merits or suspended the criminal prosecution, • (4) if, after the subsequent irrevocable conviction, it was proved that the convicted person was acquitted by another irrevocable decision or will, and• (5) if a decision of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR)establishes a violation of a right concerning the fairness of the procedure followed or the substantive provision applied (Article 6 § 1 of the ECHR and Article 47§2 of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights Union). This case in particular is discussed at the end of this brief analysis.The enumeration of the cases justifying the repetition of the procedure isrestrictive, because, as it is argued, this is dictated by the grace of the vague concept of "certainty of law"maintaining the validity of the res judicata. This is a ruthless and inhuman version, which is supported by the followers of the deification of state power and the opponents of the principles of humanity, civilization and human rights, as well as by those who support the predominance of the strong over the weak and the mass over the unit.According to the modern point of view, which is in line with our era of the second decade of the 21st century, it is not allowed that any "security of the law" should come before the innocence and freedom of the last citizen (given the de facto unconstitutional social classifications of citizens into classes of patricians and plebeians, strong and weak, depending on the strengths of each, mainly economic and political, as this is also formulated in court decisions or, at least, in most of them), which is involved in the persecution mechanisms of the modern totalitarian state, which appears under the torn cloak of the so-called "democratic state", the institutions of which no one is taught and no one respects, and the state apparatus and its organs (which staff and transform the distinct functions of the state into powers) are abhorred, in every "opportunity" in any case.legal certaintyis qualified and must be respected onlyby the issuance of correct and fair decisions, by virtue of a fair (calm and comfortable) criminal procedure that respects all the rights and not only the basic rights of the accused as well as the fundamental principles of law among which theprinciple of leniency, the acquittal in doubt and not the conviction of the accused (in dubio pro reo), the observance of the principle of proportionality between the act of the perpetrator-accused and the imposed (and punishing) sentence, the non-transformation of the accused from a subject to an object for general preventive reasons, the respect of the accused's right to remain silent and not to incriminate himself (nemo tenetur), the absolute respect for the dignity of the accused (before, during and after the trial), the presumption of innocence, the prohibition of the appearance, swearing and examination of incompetent witnesses, who are appointed in droves and made "witnesses" by the state prosecuting apparatus, and the relevant authorities that have assumed supra-constitutional power with the obligation to fully implement the HCDHEE from 01.12.2009 (based on the declared objectives of the European Union, which are based on the tripartite: Peace, Prosperity and Values of the Union and cover, as key axes, among others, the area of freedom, security and justice).The reasons for repeating the procedure differ in terms of their conditions, regulatory scope and importance and are divided into absolute and relative. Cases 1, 3 and 4 are defined as absolute in paragraph 1 of article 525, while case 2 of the same article, which refers tothe disclosure of new facts or evidence, is considered a relevant reason. The new reasons for repeating element 5 of article 525 § 1 and article 525A of the C.P.D. are also classified as absolute reasons. According to the grammatical wording of the law, no limitation is placed on the retrial regarding the review of the essential conditions of the conviction. This is why the repetition of the procedure is founded and when the relevant reason does not refer directly to the actual conviction, but to the utilization of the evidence, which formed the basis of the final conviction decision.1. Conviction by different decisions of two defendants for the same act.Conditions for the application of case 1 of article 525 § 1 of the C.P.D. are set: • (a΄) the existence of conviction of two or more persons for the same act, • (b΄) the existence of different irrevocable decisions and • (c΄) the determination of the incompatibility of irrevocable decisions. The act for which two or more people were convicted by the two or more irrevocable judicial decisions must be the same, understood as idem factum and not as idem crimen, because the identity of the act refers to the historical fact and not to the legal characterization. The mere change in the nominis juris of the crime, without a corresponding change in actual fact, does not differentiate the criminal act, since the elements fulfilling the legal form of the crime remain the same. The identity of a deed is understood as the identity of the facts, that is, of the same historical events at the time and place of their occurrence, which constitute the charge according to its essential objective elements, regardless of the legal characterization given to them by the courts when issuing the different decisions.The claimed in the context of article 525 § 1 C.P.D. an irrevocable decision covers the requirement of the law, both in the case in which it is irrevocable only with respect to the one who requests the repetition of the procedure (relative res judicata), and in the case in which it is irrevocable as part of its operative part (partial res judicata). The possible requirement of the existence of an absolutely irrevocable decision would oppose both the purpose of repeating the procedure and its character as a procedural mechanism for the redress of the multitude ofjudicial plans, for the activation of which it is enough to make the injustice suffered by the convicted person evident.2. Disclosure of new facts or evidence.factsare defined as immediately or indirectly empirically perceptible, specific and demonstrable present or past occurrences or events.evidenceis understood to mean the factual elements and, in particular, the evidence specific to their content, on the basis of which it becomes possible for the impartial and experienced judge to form knowledge regarding the truth of the factual facts crucial to the case. Asnew facts or evidencethose facts that were not submitted to the sentencing court, regardless of whether they were created later or existed before the conviction, are considered. Given that any element that was not submitted until the end of the hearing process in order to become accessible to the sentencing judges is characterized as a new factual element, the alleged relevant investigation is carried out exclusively in the light of all the members of the sentencing court, regardless of whether the factual element that was not taken into account by the court was known to the accused or to the other actors of the trial. Therefore, as new facts or evidence are characterized not only those that were not submitted to the judgment of the sentencing court but also those that ultimately did not really become the object of assessment and evaluation on the part of the judging judge during the formation of the so-called "judicial conviction".Asunknownto the convicting judgesfacts or evidenceare considered, in the true sense of article 525 § 1 no. 2 of the Civil Code, those facts which were not really perceived by the court either by themselves or by their actual content and this is not rare, taken in view of the appliedsummary procedures, through which even the most complex trials are completed, following which most of them are imposed with incredible rigor, cruelty and inhumanity penalties. This is also due to the general lack of cooperation between the actors of the trial, prosecutors, judges and lawyers, which adversely affects the fate and criminal treatment of citizens, especially the young, the economically and socially powerless and foreigners (immigrants or so-called illegal immigrants) to whom the "doubt against the accused" rule is applied.Investigated and rejected evidence, even if erroneously assessed, does not establish a reason for retrial, while it should establish a very important reason for a retrial, because the erroneous judicial assessment is not allowed to result in the conviction of the persecuted innocent citizen for any reason and any security or insecurity of law and is not consistent with the basic principle of constitutional limitation of value (dignity) of man.3. Falsehood or falsification of information, bribery or breach of duty. A. False witness statements or expert opinions. Falseis the evidence, the content of which is contrary to reality.Adepositionis understood to be any statement made by the examinee, exposing his knowledge of certain facts.communicationcan be oral, written or even coded, in the case of special language communication with the deaf.opinionmeans the report of expertise, in which the person with the special knowledge of a certain science or art contributes findings of his knowledge object or diagnoses specific facts or elements or evaluates them.A retrial is not permitted if the act of false testimony or opinion was known at the time of the trial, because a motion for retrial requires that the false testimony or opinionhave had a material influencein the conviction of the applicant. If therefore the falsity was known and was not taken into account or it is excluded from the beginning that it influenced the court, then there is no question of miscarriage of justice. After all, the tendency is to reject the applications for the repetition of the procedure, because it is considered by the majority of modern judges that the authority of their judgments is allegedly questioned by the awarding of substantial justice, instead of the formal one, through which it seems to "pacify" society and to wrong the weak citizen, the young, the economically powerless and the foreigner (of immigration or, according to modern, progressive terminology, the illegal immigrant), without, of course, from this injustice affecting (at least visibly) the interests of anyone and, especially, the interests of the powerful and those in custody.B. False Evidence or Persuasion.Forged evidence or evidence must be either non-genuine, forged, or the product of false attestation or fabrication of false attestation. The non-genuine or falsified or untrue documents must have been brought with reference to the hearing procedure as true and must have been read and evaluated according to the terms of article 364 C.P.D. Otherwise, the relevant reason for retrial is rejected as inadmissible, without investigating whether the documents referred to would have had a material influence on the conviction of the applicant. This means that it is not enough that they were invoked exclusively in the pre-trial, nor that they were simply proposed by a party in the audience, without being read and utilized for the issuance of a decision. It is necessary to show that the documents in question were brought and used in the hearing to the detriment of the convicted person, because the prevailing tendency is to reject requests for a retrial from the outset.C. Bribery or Other Willful Violation of Judge or Jury Duty.Asbriberyor other intentionalviolation of the duty of a judge or juryis meant the crimes of bribing a judge (Article 237 § 1 CC), violation of judicial secrecy (Article 251 CC), concealing grounds for exception (Article 254 Civil Code) and breach of duty (Article 259 Civil Code).This limited list of crimes, which, according to the legislator, constitute a reason for repeating the procedure, reflects the exceptional character of this provision of the Criminal Code. and his unfavorable treatment by the authorities. There is no shortage of opinions, which rightly argue that the specific sub-case of article 525 § 1 no. 3 C.P.D. it becomes irrelevant because the specific criminal acts almost never make it to the criminal court records. It is also pointed out that, as the claim of impartiality and objectivity of the public service acquires greater weight in the case of judicial officers, the provision of the possibility of establishing the basis for the repetition of the procedure with the specific criminal acts seems to simultaneously promote the right-wing image of the penal system itself. This is an interpretive failure and an interpretive pretext, because nothing promotes the "righteous image" of the criminal system except the complete exclusion of the consistently observed conviction of innocent and weak citizens, mainly young, destitute and foreigners (immigrants without "papers") with the highly summary criminal proceedings held mainly by the higher criminal courts (the criminal appeals courts), in convictions of which there are often well-founded exculpatory minorities (so that it is possible to speak of observed relative progress, of instilling a few drops of dew into the thicket of convictions, as an old and true criminologist would point out).4. The existence of a contrary irrevocable acquittal or will.The finding of the existence of an irrevocable acquittal or will, contradicting the irrevocable conviction of the same person for the same act, constitutes strong evidence of the existence of a factual error in one of the two decisions being compared. It is required as a condition for the existence of contradictory decisions and, in particular, the invocation of a certain irrevocable judicial judgment (decision or will), which is opposed to the irrevocable conviction that is challenged with the request for a retrial. If, therefore, the subsequent judgment concerns again the conviction of the same person for the act, for which he was previously convicted, there is no question of the application of article 525 § 1 no. 4 K.P.D. and, therefore, the process cannot be repeated.A prerequisite for the possibility of invoking an irrevocable decision of acquittal, the issuance of which preceded the irrevocable conviction of the applicant himself, is the finding that the existence of the acquittal was unknown both to the court, which could otherwise take it into account ex officio, and to the convicted person, who would be able to raise it at the trial that resulted in his conviction, or, on default, before the appellate court. In conclusion, both the conflicting judgments of conviction and acquittal must be irrevocable, i.e. no appeal against them is allowed or the allowed appeal was not filed within the legal deadline or was filed within the deadline and was rejected. An application submitted, while the period for exercising the remedies provided by law lasts, is considered inadmissible and, therefore, the grantor of an acquittal, if he is imprisoned, will remain for an indefinite period, perhaps until his sentence is served, in prison, waiting, patiently and as long as necessary, for the acquittal to become irrevocable (and when acquitted he will apply for compensation to receive, if receive, at most, the amount of €29 per day of unjust deprivation of his liberty).5. Violation of a right concerning the fairness of the procedure followed.The concept of the right that concerns thefair characterof the observed procedure includes all the rights and freedoms of Title I of the ECHR (Articles 2-18 ) and those rights established by additional protocols ratified by Greece and mainly the fundamental rights, provided for by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, in force from 011.012.2009 together with the Treaty of Lisbon. According to Article 6 § 1 of the ECHR, "every person has the right to have his case tried fairly, publicly and within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial court, legally functioning, which will decide either on the disputes over the rights and obligations of a civil nature, or on the merits of each against the criminal accusation". The general right toa fair trialand the individual rights of the accused arise from this wording.Afair trialis defined as one that is conducted with the essential observance of all the rights of the parties as well as the obligations of the criminal justice institutions, seeking at the same time the more complete formation or expansion of the existing legislative framework for the effective defense of the parties and ensuring the integrity of the process. The more specific condemnation decisions of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) against our country, following which the relevant reason for repeating the procedure was founded, according to article 525 § 1 no. 5 of the Civil Code, composethree separate categories of cases of violation of the fundamental right regarding the fair nature of the procedure: • (a') the first refers to the violation of the right to provide sufficient time and necessary facilities to the accused in order to prepare his defense, • (b) the second includes the cases of violation of the right to subpoena and examine witnesses and • (c) the third includes the cases of violation of the right to a reasonable time (reasonable term – reasonable duration) of conducting the trial. Only the obligation to achieve a result for the offending state derives from the ECtHR's decisions, as the choice of the appropriate means to this end rests in principle with the latter. Therefore, in order to correct any errors, the Court of Strasbourg does not develop an annulment effect in relation to the decision of the national court, but for this it is necessary to take remedies under domestic law. It is argued that an "imperialist" policy of the ECtHR has already manifested itself, with decisions that extended the regulatory scope of Article 6 § 1 of the ECHR to areas such as social security and social welfare benefits, despite the grammatical limitation of the provision to civil and criminal disputes.The provision of the K.P.D. on the resumption of criminal proceedings, due to the issuance of a decision of the ECtHR, is not applied proportionally to the decision of other international judicial bodies, such as the Human Rights Committee of the United Nations Organization, while it should be applied, if Greek society would like to belong to the societies that have entered the 21st century and are not yet in the Middle Ages and in decline, a situation enjoyed by the organs of the decadent neo-Greek state, without reacting the civil society, in the absence of interest as well as information, because it fusses and deals with other things. In this regard, it should be emphasized that in order for the Greek courts to apply theTreaty of Lisbon, which has been in force since 01.12.2009 in Greece as in the entire European Union, a decision of the Plenary Session of the Supreme Court had to be issued after 1.2 years from the entry into force of this treaty (OlAP 1/2011) in order to accept the courts its application, because until the issuance of this decision the Treaty of Lisbon was not accepted (as if it did not exist). The result was that the courts postponed the hearing of the cases under various pretexts in order to first issue the decision of the Plenary and then to decide according to it. Thus, many cases were delayed and are being delayed for an excessive amount of time and many defendants, who should have been acquitted, are still in a hostage situation, i.e. in a long-term - excessive litigation in violation of the aforementioned Article 6§1 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which, despite the contrary versions, is directly related to the fairness of the process and the decision.THE CONDITIONS OF THE ACCEPTANCE OF THE REQUEST TO REPEAT THE PROCEDURE.1. The existence of an irrevocable decision.Pursuant to article 546 § 2 of the Civil Code, the decision against which an appeal is not permitted or the permitted appeal was not filed within the legal deadline or was filed within the deadline and was rejected is irrevocable.2. The existence of a conviction pursuant to article 525 of the Civil Code. for a misdemeanor or felony.The decision of the criminal court, which declares the defendant guilty of a certain criminal act and imposes a certain penalty on him, is considered to be a conviction.3. The existence of a misdemeanor or felony conviction.The criminal procedure is admissibly repeated in favor of the accused, as long as the challenged irrevocable judgment relates exclusively to a felony or a misdemeanor.THE SUBMISSION OF AN APPLICATION BY AN ENTITLED PERSONAccording to article 527 § 1 C.P.D., the application for the retrial in favor of the convicted person is submitted by him or his spouse or his blood relatives up to the second degree or by his lawyer or by the prosecutor of the court that sentenced him. This application can also be submitted after the death of the convicted person or after the completion or limitation of the sentence imposed on him. From the combined interpretation of articles 525, 527 and 528 C.P.D. it is concluded that a condition for the admission of the request to repeat the procedure is the existence of a legal interest (pre-operative, immediate and present), as defined in the correspondingly applicable article 463 of the Civil Code.Legal interestexists when the legal consequences of the conviction still exist against the convicted person and their removal is possible by repeating the procedure. In particular, it is required: • (a΄) the person entitled to submit the request for repetition must be harmed by the contested decision, that is, an adverse consequence must occur at his expense, • (b΄) the beneficiary must seek a certain benefit from the acceptance of the application and improvement of his position, • (c΄) the interest must be personal, i.e. refer to the person entitled to exercise the remedy and not to another party. The application is submitted to the prosecutor of appeals, if the irrevocable conviction was pronounced by a misdemeanor court, and to the prosecutor of the Supreme Court in any other case and must contain the reasons for which the repetition is requested as well as the evidence that confirms them, because otherwise it is inadmissible.The public prosecutor to whom the application was delivered must, within one month, check its validity with any evidentiary means, either himself or through an investigator or public prosecutor. Then he submits the application to the competent authority according to article 528 of the Code of Civil Procedure. judicial council or court where he serves. As soon as the request for retrial is submitted, the council, which is competent to judge it, decides within three days, following a proposal from the public prosecutor, on the suspension or not of the execution of the sentence served by the irrevocably convicted person. In conclusion, it becomes clear that the extraordinary nature of the repetition of the procedure provides a clear indication that the "legal order" (i.e. the competent state bodies) tolerates the existence of incorrect or incomplete judicial judgments and indicates that the legislator resolves the conflict between justice and legal certainty in favor of the latter, while the complete opposite should and should be true and applied: Let justice prevail, in any case, and exclude convicting the innocent in every case, setting aside the "certainty of law" and the constructions in general, which justify and institutionalize injustice. Thus, it is argued by the statists, that even if there were no closed number (numerus clausus) of the reasons for repeating the procedure, by its very nature the prohibition ne bis in idem must be disconnected from the correctness of the irrevocable decision, since it remains unclear who and with what criteria will decide after the issuance of an irrevocable decision if it is wrong and will authentically determine what should be the just one and correct decision, for the conquest of which it is worth starting a new criminal procedure. This is due not so much to the relativity of the truth in the criminal trial, but mainly to the fact that before the new decision is issued for the same act, no one can discount its content. But this exact retrial of the same act is excluded by virtue of the ne bis in idem principle. After all, it is not at all excluded that the decision, which will be issued in the context of the new criminal trial, will not succeed in correcting the defects of the previous irrevocable decision.These opinions are not even consistent with the fundamental principle "when in doubt, in favor of the accused's innocence", because, as it emerges from the daily judicial practice, the courts follow the completely opposite principle and in case of doubt, they are usually led, without any consequence or sanction, to condemn the weak accused, who do not have the means and capabilities to defend themselves against judicial arbitrariness. From the above, it follows, according to the prevailing erroneous versions and opinions, that the pursuit of issuing correct and fair decisions finds its limits in legal certainty, which requires that the irrevocable decision be accepted as it is in principle and that its content not be called into question.The final conclusionis that in the area of ​​res judicata, legal certainty prevails over the principle of substantive justice, as a result of which trust is undermined in the judicial state system, which is constantly moving away from Justice and its goods.The relationship between the obligation to repeat the procedure pursuant to the provision of article 525 § 1, approx. 5, of the K.P.D. and the issuance of a conviction by the ECtHR, in accordance with Article 6 § 1 of the ECHR, due to exceeding the reasonable time limit for the duration of the criminal trial. As was the case and, to a large extent, still is the case in our country, the jurisprudence did not pay much attention to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which was signed in Rome on 04.11.1950 and ratified by Greece with Law 2329/1953 and, subsequently, with the n.d. 53/1974 and acquired pan-European force from 01.12.2009 together with theTreaty of Lisbon. However, after the repeated condemnation of our country by the ECtHR for violations of the ECHR, pursuant to Article 11 of Law 2865/2000 (Government Gazette A 271/19.12.2000), case 5 was added to the 1st paragraph of Article 525 of the C.P.D. convicted. On the basis of this addition,the repetition of the procedure is allowed, if a decision of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) establishes a violation of a right, concerning the fairness of the procedure followed or the substantive provision applied.Thus, in all cases in which the ECtHR finds that the applicant's criminal conviction is contrary to the ECHR and now to the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union) there is always a legal reason to repeat the procedure [cf. paragraph 5 of the preamble of the EU Charter, where it is pointed out that this Charter confirms, respecting the competences and duties of the Community and the Union, as well as the principle of subsidiarity, the rights deriving in particular from the common constitutional traditions and international obligations of the Member States, the Treaty on European Union and the Community Treaties, the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the Social Charters adopted by the Community and the Council of Europe, as well as from the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Communities and the European Court of Human Rights Rights]. If the ECtHR found a violation of Article 6 of the ECHR in terms of the reasonable time limit for adjudicating the criminal case, which lasted for an excessively long period of time, the procedure must be repeated, in order to cure the violation by taking specific measures in favor of the convicted person, which include the reduction of the imposed sentence, the re-measurement of the sentence with the recognition of mitigating factors, because the lapse of a reasonable time is considered mitigating circumstance (PK 83 and 84§ 1), as well as the acquittal thereof.The jurisprudence of the Supreme Court does not accept the repetition of the procedure in the case of recognition by the ECtHR of the duration of the criminal trial for an excessively and irrationally long period of time, under the version that the exceeding of the reasonable period had no effect on the judgment of the court, while this is exactly what is requested [cf. unacceptable and must be rejected, because neither the applicant pleads nor does it appear that the exceeding of the reasonable deadline for adjudicating his case, which was bindingly established by the ECtHR, hada negative effecton the judgment of the criminal judges who sentenced him for criminal fraud. Moreover, exceeding the reasonable deadline is already a fait accompli, which cannot be retroactively undone. So the redress of the applicant's damage from the resulting excess cannot be achieved by repeating the procedure, with reference to AP 1638/2002. Compare recently the AP 1808/2010, about which also nomika epilekta: “the Supreme Court rejected the application of a convicted”]. Different (positive) is the impression and ultimately judgment of the court, when the accused appears before it free, and completely different (negative) will be the judgment of the court, when the accused accused has already remained in prison for more than a decade. In the second case, the prejudice of the judges against the accused is a given and results with mathematical precision in his conviction, in the absence of the required impartiality. The negative jurisprudence of the Supreme Court regarding the repetition of criminal proceedings is attributed to the reluctance to respect the decisions of the ECtHR, because the Greek courts claim infallibility, which becomes unshakable when it comes to irrevocable decisions (although judges are not gods and prone to diagnostic errors, as the president of the Supreme Court pointed out). On the other hand, the decisions of the Supreme Court never refer to other supreme courts of European or other countries (and their decisions) as if there are no other countries on the planet and other courts besides the Greek ones, because the outdated opinion prevails that we are not concerned with the decisions of foreigners as well as European courts, but only with domestic judgments and decisions.Pursuant toCA decision 1808/2010, the application of a person sentenced tolife imprisonment, which was submitted to the Supreme Court after the issuance ofno. 54871/2009 of the ECtHR decision, by which it was diagnosed that the criminal prosecution against the applicant and the criminal proceedings were prolonged beyond the reasonable period provided for in Article 6§1, subsection a, of the ECHR, i.e. the criminal proceedings and the corresponding sub-judice of the convicted-applicant lasted for an excessive period of time, resulting in the at his expense, in addition to the other consequences, moral damage assessed by the award in favor of the applicant of a symbolic sum of money. In its decision (1808/2010), the Supreme Court ruled that the criminal proceedings in favor of the applicant sentenced to life imprisonment should not be repeated, because the exceeding of the reasonable time limit is a fait accompli and cannot be reversed retroactively and, therefore, the reparation of the damage caused by the exceeding cannot be achieved by repeating the proceedings and, therefore, neither by anyone else way. So it was decided that he had been well tried for ten years and now the convicted person was both right and fair in the end and sentenced to life imprisonment and let him only blame himself, because no one is responsible for his prolonged subjugation. This version of the decision, which is also permanent jurisprudence, which was erroneously formulated in our country, is contrary to articles 41 and 13 of the ECHR (as well as the principles of humanity and civilization), according to whichsubstantial reparation is required in the event of a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the ECHR, either by reducing the penalty, or by acquitting him applicant (in the context of the imposed just satisfaction of the applicant), when it is judged by the ECtHR, that there was, as in this case, a violation of the aforementioned Article 6 § 1 of the ECHR, i.e. the principles of a fair trial, in which case Article 13 of the ECHR is activated regarding the victim's right to a real and effective appeal.It is pointed out in relation to the decision in question (AP 1808/2010), that the justification of the retrial, with the application of the provision of article 525§1, paragraph 5, of the Criminal Code, is based on the logical finding that the sentence of life imprisonment of the applicant was obviously based on evidence, which had weakened and was not suitable support to the full extent of both guilt and conviction. It would possibly be possible to justify the imposition of the final sentence only in the case in which the criminal courts in charge had complied to the last degree with the statutory conditions for conducting a fair trial, among which the observance of the reasonable deadline for the completion of the procedure, which, in the present case, lasted until the year 2011 (02.05.2011) starting in February of 2001. In the case where CA 1808/2010 was issued, the applicant's eleven-year subjudice had the logical result of the convicted person suffering adverse consequences from his endless subjudice, on a personal, family, social, professional and financial level, because the continuous and for a period of more than ten years his obligation to appear before the courts of all levels as well as the Supreme Court required the accused to deal only with the issue of his defense, with consultations with lawyers, with apologies, with preparation of the defense against the accusations, with the collection of evidence and with everything else that the litigant must deal with exclusively and intensively, without having the possibility of dealing with any other issue of his life and that of his family. In particular, the absurdly excessive duration of the sub-trial resulted, among other things, in the condemned person losing any possibility of financial and in general support for his necessary defense from the charges, in view of the fact that the passage of so many years, 1/6 of a human life, logically thwarted and canceled any, mainly financial, possibilities that would have existed at the beginning of the deprivation of life his freedom. In particular, the person who does not have financial comfort is not in a position for such a long period of time to finance and maintain a lawyer or lawyers and to have the necessary means to support his defense and the most basic one.The irrevocable recognition of the violation of the reasonable deadline by the above decision of the ECtHR implies a simultaneous recognition that the case did notreceive a fair trial, becausethe obligation to observe a reasonable deadline for the trial of this case(and any other criminal case) is connected withfair trialunder Article 6§1 of the ECHR, according to which every person has the expressly recognized individual (and fundamental) right to have his case tried fairly, publicly and within a reasonable time. Thus, the fair, public trial of the criminal case within a reasonable period of time is concluded and it is not possible to separate these statutory conditions by invoking "accomplished facts", which are not consistent with a fair judicial judgment (but with other situations and inventions related to the intended "peaces", which also includes this essentially immoral institution of property ownership at the civil level statute of limitations, which has nothing to do with justice). The delay and, indeed, the unreasonable long delay in the adjudication of the criminal case and the issuance of a conviction after many years is legally a jurisdictional error with the thought that with the passage of time and the maintenance of the accused in a state of torturous and inhuman subjugation, the purpose of the criminal trial to search for the essential truth is essentially frustrated (although this distinction between essential and formal truth is not recognized epistemological), according to the above-mentioned points. Consequently, even after the final adjudication of the criminal case, when the ECtHR confirms that the reasonable time limit has been exceeded, the immediate retrial of the procedure is required in the interest of the convicted person, because the legal order is no longer allowed to tolerate the existence of erroneous convictions, such as those issued in excess of the reasonable time limit. In other words, in every case of finding a violation of the ECHR or of the CHR (in which the ECHR was incorporated), the criminal procedure must be repeated, in accordance with article 525 § 1, item 5, of the Criminal Code, setting aside the justifications and evasions that are attempted to support the incomprehensible and illegal attempt to frustrate the specific right to re-investigate the criminal case.In this regard, it is pointed out that with the imposed sentence of the accused after the lapse of ten years under subjudicial status and deprivation of his liberty, a direct violation of the fundamental right of the presumption of innocence, which is expressly provided for by Article 48 § 1 of the Criminal Code (: every accused is presumed to be innocent until proven guilty in accordance with the law), is established. Thus, because the defendant in question was dragged from prison to prison (the existence of which is a shame for modern civilization), completing (under such a situation that defies every concept of human dignity) a period of more than ten years, it is not understood that a fair trial was held and a fair decision was made regarding a fair sentence in the final sentence (life imprisonment) after eleven years, which with the aforementioned decision he was once again approved without any substantial explanation (which is expected and will be expected) by the supreme annulment court of modern Greece, namely Areios Pagos (which, according to Isocrates, was a "monument of virtue and prudence)".