C-767/23 [Remling] (A.M.): Reasons Not to Refer to the CJEU

The judgment of 24 March 2026 in Case C-767/23 [Remling] concerns a crucial but often misunderstood right: when a case reaches a court of last instance and raises a material question of European Union law, the party concerned must be able to understand why that court did not refer the matter to the Court of Justice of the European Union.

The CJEU did not hold that every issue of EU law must be turned into a request for a preliminary ruling. It did, however, make clear that a refusal to refer cannot remain opaque. The reasons must specifically show whether the question is not necessary for deciding the case, whether it has already been answered by the CJEU, or whether the correct interpretation is so clear that there is no reasonable doubt.

1. What is Case C-767/23 [Remling]?

The official title of the case is A.M. v Staatssecretaris van Justitie en Veiligheid. The designation [Remling] is a fictitious name used to identify the case; it is not the real surname of any party. The judgment was delivered by the Grand Chamber of the CJEU on 24 March 2026, under reference ECLI:EU:C:2026:243 and identifier CELEX 62023CJ0767.

The “23” in C-767/23 is the year in which the case was registered, not the year of the judgment. The request for a preliminary ruling reached the CJEU in December 2023, but the final judgment was delivered in 2026. This distinction matters because the number assigned to an EU case often creates a mistaken impression about when the ruling was issued and became relevant.

The underlying dispute concerned a Moroccan national who was married to a Dutch citizen, was the father of children holding Dutch nationality, and sought a right of residence in the Netherlands. That immigration issue formed the factual background, but the CJEU neither recognised nor rejected A.M.'s right of residence. The central issue was procedural and institutional: how specifically must a court of last instance explain its decision not to submit a question for a preliminary ruling?

2. What Article 267 TFEU provides

The preliminary-ruling procedure allows national courts to ask the CJEU for a binding interpretation of EU law or for a review of the validity of an EU act. It is not an appeal from a national court to the CJEU. The national court remains responsible for determining the facts and delivering the final judgment, applying the answer it receives.

Where a national court's decision is not open to any further judicial remedy under national law, the third paragraph of Article 267 TFEU establishes, in principle, an obligation to refer if the interpretation or validity of a rule of EU law is necessary to resolve the dispute. Whether a court is acting as a “court of last instance” is assessed in the particular proceedings and does not depend solely on its formal name or position.

The procedure serves two purposes. First, it helps ensure that the same EU rule is applied consistently across all Member States. Second, it protects parties against national interpretations that could diverge from EU law without having been examined by the EU court with jurisdiction to give the authoritative interpretation.

3. The three exceptions established by CILFIT

The CILFIT case-law recognises three main situations in which a court of last instance may refrain from requesting a preliminary ruling:

1. The question is not necessary. The answer to the question of EU law cannot affect the outcome of the particular dispute.
2. The question has already been answered. Existing CJEU case-law provides the interpretation required, even if it does not concern facts that are identical in every respect.
3. The interpretation is obvious. The correct application of the rule is so clear that it leaves no reasonable doubt, taking account of the distinctive terminology, the different language versions and the broader legal context of EU law.

The third situation, known as acte clair, does not simply mean that the national court regards the answer as easy. It requires a degree of legal certainty that can be sustained within the multilingual and autonomous system of EU law. Reasonable divergences in case-law or the existence of different serious interpretations indicate that closer examination may be required.

4. What exactly the CJEU held in Remling

The CJEU connected the obligation under Article 267 TFEU with the right to effective judicial protection in Article 47 of the Charter. When a court of last instance does not make a reference, its reasons must enable the party to identify which of the recognised exceptions was applied in that party's case.

A lengthy, self-contained section is not always required. Brief reasons may be sufficient if they are specific and linked to the factual and legal issues in dispute. The court may also refer to adequate reasoning given by a lower court, provided that the decision read as a whole makes clear why no obligation to refer arises.

A key point in the judgment is that the duty to give reasons does not depend on whether a party submitted an express and formally worded request for a reference. If a court of last instance finds that a necessary question concerning the interpretation or validity of EU law arises, it must examine its obligation of its own motion within the framework of the applicable national procedural rules.

5. What Remling did not decide

Careful definition of the judgment's limits is essential. The ruling:

• does not require a preliminary reference in every dispute in which a rule of EU law is mentioned,
• does not give a party the right to determine the content or wording of the questions referred,
• does not turn the CJEU into an additional level of national jurisdiction,
• does not hold that every brief statement of reasons is inadequate,
• does not automatically invalidate earlier national judgments,
• does not decide whether A.M. ultimately had a right of residence.

The judgment concerns the transparency and reviewability of legal reasoning. A court may decide that no reference is needed, but it must allow a reader of the judgment to identify the reason for that conclusion.

6. What changes in practice for cases in Greece

Remling is relevant to proceedings before the Greek Supreme Court, the Council of State and any other court acting as a court of last instance in the particular procedure. The issue may arise in tax disputes, consumer protection, employment relations, public procurement, competition, immigration law, administrative penalties, data protection or EU rules on company law.

A bare assertion that “EU law has been infringed” will usually not be enough. A properly reasoned pleading should identify the applicable provision, the precise interpretative problem and how the answer may affect the operative part of the judgment. It should also explain why existing CJEU case-law does not already resolve the issue or why a reasonable doubt remains.

The value of the ruling is not that it guarantees a reference. It is that it improves the quality of the judicial dialogue: the party presents a specific question of EU law, and the court explains specifically either why it makes a reference or why one of the exceptions applies. For a controlled methodological comparison, Greek Supreme Court judgments AP 377/2026 and AP 593/2026 may be examined only to assess whether their reasoning makes the relevance or settled-interpretation exception traceable. Neither judgment applied Remling: AP 377/2026 was published before the CJEU judgment, while AP 593/2026 was deliberated before it. The CJEU did not review, approve or invalidate either Greek judgment.

7. Checklist before requesting a preliminary ruling

• Identify the exact provision of EU law whose interpretation or validity must be examined.
• Connect the answer to a specific decisive issue in the case rather than to an abstract legal debate.
• Review the relevant CURIA and EUR-Lex case-law before arguing that the issue remains unresolved.
• Set out the different reasonable interpretations and their practical consequences.
• Explain why settled national interpretation is not automatically equivalent to an earlier interpretation by the CJEU.
• Suggest neutral wording for the question, without predetermining the preferred answer.
• Request that the judgment record the reason for any decision not to refer.
• Comply with national rules on admissibility, time limits and the presentation of pleas and arguments.

8. Frequently asked questions

Can I compel a national court to refer a question to the CJEU?

No. A party may request a reference and substantiate why it is needed, but the national court decides whether the question is necessary and how it should be worded.

Is it enough that an EU regulation or directive is involved in the case?

No. The interpretation or validity of the EU rule must be necessary to decide the particular dispute. A question that cannot change the outcome does not trigger an obligation to refer.

Must the reasons be extensive?

Not necessarily. They must, however, be sufficiently specific to show which exception was applied and how it relates to the case.

What if the same issue has already been decided by the CJEU?

The national court may apply the existing interpretation without making a new reference. It must nevertheless show that the case-law genuinely answers the decisive question.

Does the judgment concern only immigration cases?

No. The immigration dispute was the background. The rule requiring reasons for a decision not to refer applies in every field governed by EU law.

Can inadequate reasons automatically invalidate the national judgment?

No, not automatically. The consequences depend on the national procedural framework, the remedies available and the circumstances of the case. Remling does not establish a single automatic mechanism for setting judgments aside.

9. Official sources

• CURIA: full text of the judgment in Case C-767/23
• EUR-Lex: CELEX 62023CJ0767
• InfoCuria: case details and status
• CJEU: Greek-language Press Release No 46/26
• EUR-Lex: Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union